CASE C OMMENTARIES
TA X A T I O N
M U N I C I PA L L I Q U O R L AW S
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that Tennessee Code
Annotated § 57-4-306 does not require municipalities to distribute
liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds to their respective counties. Coffee
County Board of Education v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832 (Tenn. 2019).

Matt Holman
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation of Tennessee
Code Annotated § 57-4-306 (“Distribution Statute”) before it was
amended in July of 2014. Specifically, the Tennessee Supreme Court
answered whether a city—with its own school system separate from the
county school system—was required to distribute tax proceeds received
from the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue
(“Commissioner”) for liquor-by-the-drink (“LBD”) sales generated within
the city to the corresponding county school system. Ultimately, the court
ruled in favor of the city, because the legislative history of the statute
suggested it was the legislature’s intent for the city to use the tax proceeds
towards its own school system, rather than distribute it to a county whose
separate governing body had not yet adopted LBD sales.
This case was one of five cases on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court in the Middle Section of Tennessee for the same question. In this
particular case, the two parties were the City of Tullahoma (“City”) and
Coffee County (“County”). Tullahoma is located in Coffee County, and
the County brought suit against the City because it believed it was entitled
to half of the LBD taxes given to the City by the Commissioner in
accordance with the Distribution Statute. Specifically, that statute states
that half of the LBD taxes “shall be expended and distributed in the same
manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and
distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A). Since 1987, when it
approved LBD sales within city limits, the City had retained all the revenue
from LBD taxes and distributed half to the City’s general fund—which
contains the funds for primary government functions—and half to its
own school system. However, the County argued that the language of the
415
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Distribution Statute required the City to distribute the LBD tax pro rata
with the County school system in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated § 49-3-315(a), which sets out the manner in which counties
distribute county property taxes for schools.
In response, the City presented two arguments to the County’s
interpretation of the statute. The City argued that the language of the
statute does not put an obligation on the City to distribute the LBD taxes
to the County; rather, the language meant that the City is supposed to
distribute the tax within its own city school system in the same way it
would if it were distributing property taxes to the County. The City’s
second contention was that the statute did not apply to the County because
it had not approved LBD sales. Interestingly, in each of the five cases on
appeal to the court, none of the counties had approved LBD sales within
their county limits.
In 2017, the trial court granted summary judgment in the City’s favor
for two reasons. First, the trial court agreed with the City’s argument that
the statute did not apply to the County because it had not approved LBD
sales; therefore, the County was not entitled to distributions under the
Distribution Statute. Second, the trial court held that, even if the County
were entitled to distributions, the language of the Distribution Statute was
ambiguous. Because the language was ambiguous, the trial court looked to
the legislative history along with the intent of the Distribution Statute and
concluded that the language did not require the City to distribute part of
the LBD tax revenue to the County.
While this case was on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals for
the Middle Section, a similar group of cases was being litigated in the
Eastern Section. Importantly, in those cases, the court issued four
contemporaneous opinions ruling in favor of the cities. That court also
held that the language of the Distribution Statute was ambiguous, and
after conducting a similar analysis to the trial court in this case, ruled that
the cities were not required to distribute any of the LBD tax revenue to
the counties.
After this ruling, the Court of Appeals hearing the instant case handed
down an opposing verdict, holding that the language of the Distribution
Statute was unambiguous and swung in the County’s favor. Ultimately, the
appellate court was persuaded by the County’s interpretation of the
statute. Specifically, it held that the Distribution Statute clearly requires the
City to distribute the tax proceeds in the same manner it distributes
property taxes to schools—meaning pro rata with the County’s schools
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according to a daily attendance formula. Because the intermediate court
held that the language was unambiguous, it did not address legislative
intent or purpose. Notably, the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged
in its opinion that all the courts and judges involved in deciding this same
issue reached several different conclusions involving legislative intent,
ambiguity, and public policy considerations.
The Distribution Statute is no stranger to legal interpretation. In fact,
it has been the subject of two separate Attorney General Opinions. See 10
Op. Atty Gen. Tenn. 231 (1980); 10 Op. Atty Gen. Tenn. 711 (1981). The
first opinion was the result of a Weakley County attorney posing a
question to the Attorney General regarding what the proper distribution
was under the Distribution Statute when a municipality, but not the county,
had approved LBD sales. See 10 Op. Atty Gen. Tenn. 231 (1980). The
Attorney General stated that only counties and municipalities that
approved LBD sales were intended to be subject to the Distribution
Statute, and therefore the counties that had not approved LBD sales were
not entitled to any of the proceeds paid to the cities. Id. Since the
publication of that Attorney General opinion, many cities have relied on
it in determining what to do with LBD proceeds from the Commissioner.
Further, the second question posed to the Attorney General posited
whether municipalities were required to distribute LBD proceeds to
county schools when the municipality did not have a school system of its
own. See 10 Op. Atty Gen. Tenn. 711 (1981). The Attorney General
reaffirmed its previous opinion, but stated that a city would clearly need
to distribute part of its proceeds from LBD tax distributions to the county
school system when it did not have a school system of its own. Id. Soon
after this second opinion, the legislature amended the statute to reflect the
interpretation the Attorney General laid out in the two opinions. That
provision, referred to as the “1982 proviso,” read as follows:
One half (1/2) of the proceeds shall be expended and
distributed in the same manner as the county property tax for
schools is expended and distributed; provided, however, that
except in [Bedford County] any proceeds expended and
distributed to municipalities which do not operate their own
school systems separate from the county are required to remit
one half (1/2) of their proceeds of the gross receipts liquor-bythe-drink tax to the county school fund.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). The Attorney General
offered a third opinion after the 1982 amendment, reaffirming that
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municipalities that had approved LBD sales were not required to distribute
LBD tax proceeds to counties that had not approved LBD sales. See 1983
Tenn. AG LEXIS 381.
After analyzing the opinions issued by the Attorney General, and
determining the City had distributed its LBD proceeds in accordance with
those opinions, the court then turned to the legislative intent behind the
statute, stating that the main point of statutory interpretation is
effectuating legislative intent. The court then eloquently explained the
difficulty in determining ambiguity for statutory interpretation purposes,
noting that there is no “reliable tool” to determine whether a statute is
ambiguous. Indeed, the Court attributed the many conflicting decisions in
these cases to the difficulty in determining ambiguity. See generally 129 Harv.
L. Rev. 2118 (2016). Regardless of the purported difficulty, however, the
court eventually concluded that the language of the statute was
ambiguous.
The court stated that, in determining ambiguity, there were several
considerations to be made—including the language of the statute, the
subject matter of the statute, the wrong the statute intended to right, and
the overall purpose sought in enacting the statute. The court then pointed
to several facts that supported the City’s reading of the statute. First, the
history of the statute suggested that the City was distributing the LBD
funds in a way consistent with the way the legislature intended because of
the opinions issued by the Attorney General and the amendments to the
statute that did not indicate an obligation to pay the County school system
from the LBD proceeds. The court noted that, because the legislature was
aware that cities were distributing LBD proceeds to their own school
systems when the amendments were made, its clear exclusion of the
County’s contentions in the subsequent amendments did not intend for
the cities to discontinue its practice of distributing LBD proceeds solely
to its own school system.
Second, because the City’s interpretation aligned with opinions issued
by the Attorney General, it could not be said that its interpretation was
clearly erroneous. Finally, because the statute was written in the passive
voice and did not indicate who was supposed to expend the tax in the
same “manner” of distribution of county property taxes, interpretation of
the statute required adding words to the statute. Both the County’s and the
City’s interpretation of the statute required adding words to the statute,
which made the Distribution Statute ambiguous. Because the distribution
statute was ambiguous, and the City’s practices were aligned with both the
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ascertained legislative intent and opinions issued by the Attorney General,
the court overturned the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section and
upheld the City’s practice of distributing half of the LBD proceeds to its
own school system.
The holding in this case represents a win for municipalities that have
approved LBD sales but are located within counties that have not
approved such sales. These cities are now able to take the proceeds paid
to them by the Commissioner and distribute half of those LBD funds into
their school systems, rather than splitting those proceeds with the county
school systems. On the other hand, the counties that have not approved
LBD sales, such as Coffee County, are losing out on a large sum of revenue
that they could put toward their schools. The ruling in this case could
incentivize counties to approve LBD sales if they have not done so already.

C O R P O R A T E G OV E R NA N C E
A T TO R N E Y -C L I E N T P R I V I L E G E
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that, under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 23-3-105, the attorney-client privilege can also extend
to communications between an entity’s legal counsel and a thirdparty nonemployee if the nonemployee is the functional equivalent
of an employee, and the communication both involves the subject
matter of the representation and is made with the intention that the
communication will be kept confidential. Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Medley,
567 S.W.3d 314 (Tenn. 2019).

Rachel West
In Dialysis Clinic Inc. v. Medley, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
addressed whether a third-party nonemployee of a client could invoke the
attorney-client privilege on requested production of documents based on
the agency relationship between the third-party and the client. Normally,
communications that take place in the presence of third parties lose their
privilege, because they are not made with the intention that the
communications be kept confidential. However, when a third party is
considered an agent of the client, the attorney-client privilege can apply if
the third party is the functional equivalent of an employee of the client.
At that point, the communication must still satisfy a two-prong test: 1) the
communication must involve the subject matter of the representation; and
2) the communication must be made with the intention that the
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communication will be kept confidential. See State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn.
Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group Test, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 602, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006). Ultimately, in this case, the Court articulated a framework that
Tennessee courts should follow when determining whether a third-party
nonemployee is the functional equivalent of an employee and should
therefore be afforded the protection of attorney-client privilege.
Dialysis Clinic, Inc. (“Dialysis Clinic”) is a corporation that owns and
operates dialysis centers. Dialysis Clinic is also in the business of owning
and leasing commercial properties to third parties. Because Dialysis
Clinic’s expertise is in dialysis centers, Dialysis Clinic hired a third-party
property management company, XMi Commercial Real Estate (“XMi”),
to manage several of its commercial properties. As an agent of Dialysis
Center, XMi was responsible for managing and operating Dialysis Center’s
properties, including negotiating lease renewals and amendments,
collecting rents, terminating leases, and handling litigation issues involving
the properties.
In 2014, Dialysis Clinic filed unlawful detainer actions against the
tenants of four of its leased properties located on Church Street in
Nashville. These actions were against Kevin Medley, individually; Kevin
Medley, LLC; Canvas Lounge, LLC; 3 Entertainment Group, LLC; and
OutCentral, Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”). As part of the
Defendants’ discovery requests, the Defendants sent XMi a request for
production of documents related to the properties at issue. In response,
XMi, under the protection of attorney-client privilege based on the
agency-relationship between XMi and Dialysis Clinic, withheld some of
the requested documents.
After a hearing and an in camera review of the disputed documents, the
trial court agreed with XMi and ruled that the documents withheld should
receive attorney-client privilege. In response, the Defendants filed a
motion for an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied.
The Defendants then applied for review by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. The court granted the application to answer the following
certified issue: “whether the trial court extended the attorney-client
privilege beyond what Tennessee law allows by finding that XMi properly
withheld certain documents from production based on attorney-client
privilege because of its agency relationship with Dialysis Clinic.”
Interestingly, the court has previously held the attorney-client privilege
applies to a third party when the third party is an agent of the client. See,
e.g., Smith Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1984).

2020]

CASE COMMENTARIES

421

However, in that case, the Court failed to formulate a definition of “agent”
when used in the context of such privilege.
Therefore, to determine whether XMi was an agent of Dialysis Clinic
and subsequently afforded the protection of attorney-client privilege, the
Court looked to case law from other jurisdictions. Turning to the Eight
Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Bieter Co., the court held that when a
third-party agent of a company is the “functional equivalent of an
employee,” the third party’s communications between the company’s
attorneys and the third-party agent will receive attorney-client privilege. 16
F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that this
protection was an extension of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court held that attorney-client privilege
should also include lower-level employees of corporations, because the
employees retain important information relating to the attorney’s
representation of the client. Likewise, in Bieter, an independent contractor
to a partnership retained vital information the attorneys of the partnership
needed in order to properly represent the partnership in the pending
litigation. See Bieter, 16 F.3d at 939. Therefore, the Court extended the
independent contractor the protection of the attorney-client privilege
under the functional equivalent analysis.
Other jurisdictions have since adopted the functional equivalent
analysis as articulated by the Eight Circuit. These jurisdictions have
followed the same logic by reasoning that third-party nonemployees, and
not the client, are sometimes the individuals who hold important
information that the client’s attorneys will need to prepare and defend in
litigation. 1
1 See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an owner
of an insurance company that denied having employee status at the company was the
functional equivalent of a company employee because he had authority to communicate
with the company’s attorneys about legal matters); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 879 F. Supp.
2d 454 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (determining that a pharmaceutical consulting firm was the
functional equivalent of an employee of a pharmaceutical company because of the
consulting firm’s development and implementation of a brand maturation plan for the
pharmaceutical company); In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (concluding that a public relations firm was the functional equivalent of an
employee of a corporate client because the firm communicated with the corporate client’s
counsel about the scandal and litigation in order to advise the client); Huggins v. Prince
George’s Cty., No. AW-07-825, 2008 WL 11366503, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2008) (holding
that a landscaping company was the functional equivalent of an employee of a landowner
because the landscaping company communicated directly with the landowner’s counsel
in confidence about information the counsel needed to defend the landowner).
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The court also cited to other Tennessee courts when formulating the
framework for how Tennessee should define “agent” within the attorneyclient privilege protection. 2 After synthesizing case law from outside and
inside its jurisdiction, the Court determined that the functional equivalent
analysis should be adopted by the Tennessee courts when addressing
whether a third-party nonemployee’s communication with counsel of the
client should be afforded the protection of attorney-client privilege.
Not only did the court adopt the functional equivalent analysis, but the
court also enumerated non-exclusive factors to consider when
determining whether a third-party nonemployee is the functional
equivalent of an employee. According to the court, the factors to consider
are:
whether the nonemployee performs a specific role on behalf of
the entity; whether the nonemployee acts as a representative of
the entity in interactions with other people or other entities;
whether, as a result of performing its role, the nonemployee
possesses information no one else has; whether the
nonemployee is authorized by the entity to communicate with
its attorneys on matters within the nonemployee’s scope of
work to facilitate the attorney’s representation of the entity; and
whether the nonemployee’s communications with the entity’s
attorneys are treated as confidential.

The court further explained that the functional equivalent analysis is
only the first prong of determining whether a communication with a thirdparty nonemployee should receive attorney-client privilege; after the court
determines as much, the court must still consider whether the relationship
satisfies the traditional requirements of a communication protected by the
2 See Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., 190 F.R.D. 463 (W.D.
Tenn. 1999) (holding that a third-party insurance broker was the functional equivalent of
an employee of the insured corporation because the communication between the broker
and insured corporation’s attorney were made for the purpose of seeking legal advice and
with the intention of keeping the communication confidential); Jones v. Nissan N. Am.,
Inc., No. 3:07-0645, 2008 WL 4366055 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 17, 2008) (determining that a
third-party medical director of Nissan was the functional equivalent of an employee of
Nissan because she held the records of medical restrictions on Nissan Employees and
was necessary for discussions with Nissan’s counsel during a workers’ compensation
case); Waster Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Krystal Co., No. E2017-01094-COA-R9-CV, 2018
WL 4673616 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018) (holding that a third-party vendor was the
functional equivalent of an employee of Krystal because the vendor was lead for
negotiating a waste services deal for Krystal and communicated directly with Krystal’s inhouse counsel about changing waste service providers).
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attorney-client privilege by determining whether the communication
involves the subject matter of counsel’s representation and whether the
communication was made in confidence.
Applying this two-step framework to the case at hand, the court first
addressed whether XMi was the functional equivalent of an employee of
Dialysis Center. Applying the court’s own factors and recognizing XMi’s
special ability to perform functions for Dialysis Center that Dialysis Center
had no ability to fulfill for itself, the court held that XMi was the functional
equivalent of an employee of Dialysis Center. Then, the court moved to
the second step of the framework and concluded that XMi communicated
with Dialysis Center’s counsel for the purpose of relaying information
about lease matters in order for counsel to best represent Dialysis Center.
Therefore, the information was directly related to the subject matter of
counsel’s representations. In a similar vein, the court also concluded that
because both Dialysis Center and XMi testified to their intentions that the
communications remain confidential, the communications satisfied the
traditional requirements of attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
In light of this ruling, Tennessee practitioners should be fully versed
on the court’s list of considered factors, as they provide a helpful guide.
Importantly, this case officially set the framework to be applied by a
Tennessee court when determining whether a communication by a thirdparty nonemployee should be granted attorney-client privilege and
provides practitioners a clear rule to follow in order to keep confidential
communications confidential. In practice, attorneys should apply the
factors articulated by the court with their communications with third-party
nonemployees to determine whether their communications will receive
protection. Being aware of one’s client’s functionally equivalent employees
will save your client both hardship and money in future litigation.
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T I T L E VII
S TA T U T E O F L I M I TA T I O N S
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
contractual clauses purporting to shorten the statute of limitations
period to bring lawsuits under Title VII are unenforceable. Logan v.
MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019).

Bei Yang
In Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, the Sixth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the statute of limitations to bring suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be contractually shortened. Upon review,
the Sixth Circuit held that the contractual alteration of the statute of
limitations cannot supersede the statutory limitation period under Title
VII and held the limitation period in the agreement unenforceable.
This case arose out of an employment discrimination dispute between
an employee and her former employer. Plaintiff Barbrie Logan (“Logan”)
started working as a culinary utility worker for Defendant MGM Grand
Detroit Casino (“MGM”) in August 2007. As a condition of her
employment, Logan agreed to a six-month limitation period for any claim
arising out of her employment with MGM. On December 4, 2014, Logan
resigned but alleged that the resignation was a constructive discharge
caused by the discriminatory conduct of her employer. On July 8, 2015,
two hundred and sixteen (216) days later, Logan filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) against MGM, alleging discrimination based on sex and
retaliation for participation in a protected activity. Shortly thereafter, in
November 2015, the EEOC issued Logan a right-to-sue letter. On
February 17, 2016, exactly four hundred and forty (440) days after Logan’s
resignation, Logan filed a lawsuit against MGM for discrimination under
Title VII. Importantly, Logan filed the lawsuit within the statutory
limitation period under Title VII but after the contractual six-month
limitation period in her employment agreement.
MGM argued that Logan’s claim should be time-barred because Logan
did not commence the action arising out of the employment within the
contractually agreed six-month period. The district court agreed with
MGM and entered summary judgment in its favor. Following this ruling,
Logan then appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit
held that the contractual alteration of the statute of limitation under Title
VII was not enforceable. In reversing the lower court’s ruling, the Sixth
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Circuit based its holding on two main considerations: (1) the detailed
enforcement scheme of Title VII; and (2) the national implications of
congressional anti-discrimination policies.
With respect to the enforcement scheme of Title VII, the court first
emphasized the procedure and function of the EEOC. Notably, no
employee can sue his/her employer directly under Title VII; rather, an
employee has to first bring the dispute before the EEOC for resolution.
Specifically, the EEOC process begins by the employee filing a “charge”
with the EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2009). However, in some
“deferral jurisdictions” that have “State or local law prohibiting the
unlawful employment practice alleged,” and “a State or local agency with
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice,” the filing period may
be extended to three hundred (300) days. Id. 1 The case at hand arose in
Michigan, which is a deferral jurisdiction, so the three hundred-day (300)
limitation period applied for Logan. 2
After the filing of the “charge” with the EEOC, the EEOC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for 180 days. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 3
Following this period of time, the EEOC will then issue a “right-to-sue
letter” if the EEOC makes any of the following conclusions: (1) that
“there is not reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment
practice has occurred;” (2) that “a violation has occurred, and that the
employer refuses to enter into a conciliation agreement, and the EEOC
decides not to pursue a civil action against the employer;” (3) the EEOC
entered into a conciliation agreement but the complaining employee has
not entered into the conciliation agreement; or (4) where the charge is
dismissed. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19(a), 1601.28(b). Once the EEOC issues a
“right-to-sue letter,” the employee has 90 days to sue the employer. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
The 300-day period applies when the employee has actually instituted a proceeding
with the appropriate state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). When the State or local
proceeding starts, the State or local agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint
for the first sixty (60) days after the filing, unless it terminates the complaint earlier. Id. §
2000e-5(c). If the EEOC has a “work-sharing agreement” with state and local agencies,
the EEOC may waive the 60-day deferral period and take immediate action. See EEOC
v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 121 (1988).
2 The Michigan Department of Civil Rights is the applicable agency in the state for
investigating unlawful employment practices, and it has entered into a “work-sharing
agreement” with EEOC. See Detriot Field Office Information, https://
eeoc.gov/field/detroit/fepa.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
3 See also EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999).
1
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The EEOC’s main task is not to adjudicate claims but to eliminate the
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods, including
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Therefore, the court believed
that by putting the EEOC procedure in between the litigants and the court
system, Congress’s purpose was to “afford non-compliant employers the
chance to voluntarily cure their violations before Title VII litigation may
be brought against them.” Consequently, the court worried that allowing
alteration of the statute of limitations set in Title VII would “remov[e] the
incentive of employers to cooperate with the EEOC” and “encourag[e]
litigation that gives short shrift to pre-suit investigation and potential
resolution of disputes through the EEOC and analog state and local
agencies.”
Apart from the procedure and function of the EEOC, the court also
emphasized the fact that Title VII contains its own limitation period,
rather than using a general limitation period or choosing not to set a
limitation period at all. The court acknowledged that statutes of
limitations traditionally are treated as “procedural” mechanisms. However,
the court noted that according to the Supreme Court, “where statutes that
create rights and remedies contain their own limitation periods, the
limitation period should be treated as a substantive right,” and such rights
are generally “not waivable in advance.” 4 Accordingly, because Title VII
contains its own limitation period, the court concluded that the limitation
period to sue under Title VII is “a substantive, rather than procedural,
rule,” and is not therefore, “prospectively waivable.”
To show that enforcing the express limitation period of Title VII is in
harmony with previous interpretation of similar statutes, the court
compared previous cases in which contractual limitation periods were
allowed with those in which the contractual limitation periods were
disallowed. On one hand, the court found that some previous cases had
allowed the parties to contractually shorten limitation periods for claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and ERISA. However, the court pointed out that
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and ERISA do not have self-contained limitation periods;
only general limitation periods applied. On the other hand, the court had
also previously disallowed parties to contractually define limitation periods
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Equal Pay Act
(“EPA”). The court noted that Congress had specifically set the statute of
limitation for FLSA claims, which also applied to the EPA because “the
In its analysis, the court mainly relied on Supreme Court precedent in Davis v. Mills,
194 U.S. 451 (1904) and Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
4
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EPA was an amendment to the FLSA.” The court again emphasized that
“when a federal law that extends rights to private individuals contains its
own limitation period . . . we should put the statutory limitation period on
the substantive side of the ledger.” Accordingly, the court concluded that
the contractual statute of limitation periods in those contexts were treated
differently, because the limitation period was a non-waivable substantive
right under the FLSA and EPA—based on the inclusion of the limitation
periods within those statutes—and was contractually alterable under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and ERISA—because the limitation periods were not within
those statutes.
As to the court’s second main consideration—the uniform national
scope of Title VII—the court pointed out that the objective behind the
enactment of Title VII was to “achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers,” and this objective was “national in
scope” and required “uniform enforcement.” To allow the limitation
period of a Title VII claim to be altered by contracts would leave the
validity of the contractually altered limitation period to individual statelaw contract principles. As a result, courts might reach different
conclusions applying different state contract laws and would thus
“frustrate or interfere with the implementation of [the] national policies
of Title VII, while derailing the integrated, multistep enforcement
procedure.” Therefore, the court reasoned that the uniform application of
Title VII also warranted invalidating the contractual limitation period in
this case.
It is important to note that the court distinguished its holding for
contractual limitation periods under a Title VII claim when occurring in
the arbitration context. In that context, the court suggested it would apply
a “case-by-case approach” and balance the “liberal policy favoring
arbitration” and “the important goals of federal anti-discrimination
statutes.” In other words, in the arbitration context, the limitation period
to bring a Title VII claim could be contractually altered, but it would be
held unenforceable if it is “unduly burdensome” to the litigant.
Specifically, the court stressed that “outside the arbitration context,
Congress has not authorized litigants to alter the Title VII limitations
periods.”
In light of this decision, employers need to be aware that the statute
of limitation for a Title VII claim cannot be contractually altered in an
employment agreement, and thus, they should not let their guard down
when they have contractually agreed to such. If employers want more
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flexibility and control in the limitation period under Title VII, they could
instead resort to arbitration and set a reasonable limitation period for filing
arbitration request in their employment agreement beforehand.

C O P Y R I G H T L AW
INFRINGEMENT
The United States Supreme Court held that a claimant may
commence an infringement suit only when the U.S. Copyright
Office registers a copyright; an application alone does not suffice to
make registration. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019).

Walker Lewis
In Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, the Supreme
Court resolved a circuit split and addressed an issue of statutory
interpretation in answering whether copyright registration occurs when an
owner files an application to register a copyright or when the U.S.
Copyright Office registers the copyright.
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (“Fourth Estate”) is an
online news organization that licenses its publications out to other
websites but retains the copyright to its material. One such website that
Fourth Estate licensed its material to was Wall-Street.com, LLC (“WallStreet”). The licensing agreement required that Wall-Street, upon
cancelling the agreement, remove all of Fourth Estate’s material from the
website. Prior to this action, Wall-Street cancelled the licensing agreement,
but failed to remove the licensed material. Accordingly, Fourth Estate sued
Wall-Street and its owner for copyright infringement, claiming that an
application 1 to the U.S. Copyright Office for registration was sufficient to
satisfy the statutory prerequisite to a copyright action. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(2008).
Wall-Street and its owner subsequently moved to dismiss, arguing that
full registration 2 under § 411(a) was a prerequisite to filing suit. The
District Court agreed, dismissing the case. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
finding that dismissal was warranted “[b]ecause registration occurs when
the Register of Copyrights ‘register[s] the claim.’” 856 F.3d 1338, 1339
1
2

The Court characterized this as the “application approach.”
The Court referred to this as the “registration approach.”
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(11th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit’s
holding, like that of the Tenth Circuit, was opposite of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuit’s position on this issue. 3 Compare La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors
Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005), with Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), and Positive Black Talk, Inc. v.
Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Supreme

Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
Pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, an author retains exclusive
rights to their work immediately upon creation. See 17 § U.S.C. 106 (2002);
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003) (“[F]ederal copyright protection . . .
run[s] from the work’s creation.”). However, § 411(a) adds an administrative

prerequisite to enforcing that right. Thus, despite the language in the
Copyright Act, the threshold matter in any copyright infringement action
is clearly registration. As Congress described:
[no] civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit,
application, and fee required for registration have been delivered
to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has
been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action
for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint,
is served on the Register of Copyrights.

Thus, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue at hand was the
interpretation of the word “registration.” Fourth Estate argued for an
interpretation consistent with finding registration to be the application by
the copyright owner, because Congress did not define the word
“registration” and because of their use of passive voice. 4 The Court did
not accept this reading of the statute, however, finding that interpreting §
3 In Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson the Eighth Circuit, in dicta, endorsed the “application
approach” applied by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit. 462 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006).
The Seventh Circuit was conflicted on the matter, endorsing both approaches in differing
dicta. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
that an application must be filed, thereby approving the “application” approach). But see
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the application must
be granted or denied, thereby approving the “registration” approach). The First and
Second Circuits have acknowledged the circuit splits but have yet to definitively rule on
the matter. See Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2014);
Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773, 779 (1st Cir. 2014).
4 Fourth Estate raised this issue, but the Court quickly dismissed the notion, stating
how the word “registration” was used depends on the specific context of the phrase, not
the passive voice. As such, this issue will not be further discussed.
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411(a) in that manner would impart contrary meanings to the word
“registration” in back-to-back sentences.
The Court reasoned that if a mere application was sufficient to satisfy
the word “registration” in the first sentence of § 411(a), it would not have
been necessary for Congress to include the next sentence—in fact, it
would be a “superfluous” inclusion. Specifically, if the Court were to read
§ 411 in the manner that Fourth Estate argued, the word “registration” in
the first sentence would mean the claimant’s application for registration,
but in the next sentence, the word would mean the exact opposite: the
Register of Copyright’s review of the application. The Court declined to
read different meanings into the same word in consecutive sentences and
noted that the third sentence of § 411(a) further supported its conclusion.
That provision provides that the Register of Copyrights may become a
party to a suit “with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright
claim,” and thus, reading the word “registration” as merely an application
would eliminate the Register’s ability to become a party in a suit for an
application it had not yet reviewed.
Moreover, the Court listed additional reasons as to the validity of its
interpretation—chiefly the meaning of the word “registration” in § 410.
That section discusses the review and examination of submitted materials
and the subsequent issuance, or non-issuance, of a certificate of
registration. Further, § 410(d) provides that once the U.S. Copyright Office
determines that a submission is registrable, the effective date of
registration is the date that the claimant made a proper submission.
Accordingly, if the registration and application were to be interpreted to
have the same meaning, Congress would not have delineated or specified
“the effective date of registration.” Furthermore, the Court took
additional note of § 408, explaining that an author of material vulnerable
to predistribution infringement would have no need to apply for
preregistration if all they needed to do was file an application for
registration and suddenly be allowed to enforce their copyright.
Next, the Court backed up its reasoning by deciphering congressional
intent. The Court stated that part of Fourth Estate’s error in reading the
Copyright Act was in their “misapprehension” of some of the 1976
revisions. Notably, § 411(a)’s predecessor previously provided, “[n]o action
or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any
work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies
and registration of such work shall have been complied with.” 17 U.S.C. §
13 (1970 ed.). This provision left the same question as presented in this
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case open, but it was a question that the Court claimed was similarly
answered by Judge Learned Hand in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F. 2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
While Fourth Estate maintained that the 1976 revisions to the
Copyright Act adopted the dissenting opinion in Vacheron, 5 the Court
dispelled that argument. The Court noted that Congress’s revisions
supported the Court’s conclusion based on the second sentence in §
411(a)—specifically, the sentence which provides for the situation in which
registration is refused. Additionally, the Court noted all the failed attempts
that have been made over time to pressure Congress to repeal § 411(a).
The Court firmly believed that Congress intended the provision to stay,
because despite the past revisions Congress has needed to make to comply
with other law, Congress has kept the other parts of § 411(a). 6
Lastly, the Court thwarted Fourth Estate’s final attempted workaround
when they raised the issue of the statute of limitations. Indeed, Fourth
Estate argued that a copyright owner might lose their ability to enforce
their rights if the statute of limitations ran. In response to this argument,
the Court cited the statute of limitations for an infringement claim—three
years—and compared it with the current wait times cited from the
Government Accounting Office: seven months. Accordingly, the Court
stated there would be ample time to receive—or be denied—registration
and then to subsequently sue before the statute of limitations ran.
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fourth Estate, which resolved
the circuit split surrounding what action constituted “making registration,”
practitioners should inform their clients of the newly cemented
prerequisite. The Court has clarified that the application alone does not
suffice to make registration, and that it is the action on the part of the U.S.
Copyright Office in receiving and making a decision on the application
that qualifies as registration. The Court’s decision could have negative legal
ramifications for any client who is proceeding under the other
interpretation of registration, and American practitioners should take care
to keep their clients abreast of the new standard.

5 The dissenting judge argued that an application alone constituted registration for
the purposes of filing an infringement suit. 260 F.2d at 642–46 (Clark, C.J. dissenting).
6 For example, in 1988, Congress revised the statute, removing “foreign works” in
order to comply with the Berne Convention. Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-568, § 102 Stat. 2859 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 411).
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FA I R D E B T C O L L E C T I O N P R A C T I C E S A C T
T H I R D PA RT I E S
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act imposes a duty on debt collectors to prevent third
parties from engaging in foreclosure activities after receiving notice
that the debtor disputes the debt. Scott v. Trott Law, P.C., 760 F. App’x
387 (6th Cir. 2019).

Kaleb Byars
In Scott v. Trott Law, P.C. (“Scott”), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”) imposes an
affirmative duty on debt collectors to prevent elements of a foreclosure
from occurring after they receive notice that the debtor disputes the debt.
The FDCPA expressly requires a debt collector to “cease collection of the
debt” after receiving notice that the debtor disputes the debt. The Sixth
Circuit held this statute specifically imposes an affirmative duty on debt
collectors to not only halt debt collection activity themselves, but also to
prevent third parties from engaging in debt collection activity.
Kevin Scott (“Debtor”) obtained a mortgage (the “debt”) on his
Michigan home in 2004. After nonpayment, the bank retained Trott Law,
P.C. (“Debt Collector”) to collect Debtor’s debt via a foreclosure
proceeding. In accordance with the FDCPA, on September 20, 2016, Debt
Collector sent Debtor a letter notifying Debtor of the foreclosure and of
Debtor’s rights. The letter informed Debtor he had a right to dispute the
debt, and that if Debtor disputed the debt within thirty days, Debt
Collector would procure and provide verification of the debt.
On October 5, 2016, Debt Collector took three important actions: it
(1) arranged for a sheriff ’s auction of the home—to occur on November
8, 2016; (2) arranged for the local newspaper to post a foreclosure notice
at Debtor’s home and advertise the foreclosure for four consecutive
weeks; and (3) mailed the foreclosure notice to Debtor. However, on
October 8, Debtor responded to Debt Collector’s September 20 letter to
dispute the debt’s legitimacy. After receiving Debtor’s dispute letter—
which was received within the thirty-day timeframe—Debt Collector took
no further action to collect the debt. However, Debt Collector did not
cancel or otherwise delay the sheriff ’s auction or the newspaper’s postings
or advertisements. Furthermore, Debt Collector failed to respond to
Debtor’s further attempts to communicate with Debt Collector.
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After learning that Debt Collector had not delayed or cancelled the
foreclosure after Debtor sent his dispute letter, Debtor filed a complaint
on October 20, 2016, alleging civil violations. First, Debtor sought an
injunction to prevent the November 8 foreclosure auction. Additionally,
the complaint alleged Debt Collector’s actions violated the FDCPA,
among other state and federal laws. Debt Collector responded in
opposition to Debtor’s motion for temporary injunction.
In December, the district court gave Debtor and Debt Collector three
months to conduct discovery. After four months, the court granted Debt
Collector’s motion for summary judgment, finding the Debt Collector
“cease[d] collection of the debt” because it did not itself engage in debt
collection activity after receiving Debtor’s dispute. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether five of Debt Collector’s activities violated the
FDCPA: (1–3) Debt Collector’s three actions taken on October 5, 2016 as
provided above; (4) Debt Collector’s failure to communicate with Debtor;
and (5) Debt Collector’s response in opposition to Debtor’s injunction. 1
First, the Sixth Circuit set forth the applicable provisions of the
FDCPA. Importantly, Michigan law permits mortgage foreclosures via
advertisement. See Mich. Comp. laws § 600.3201 (1979). However, when a
debt collector executes such a foreclosure, it “must publish a detailed
notice for four consecutive weeks in a county newspaper and publish the
notice in a conspicuous place on the premises.” Id. § 600.3208. Moreover,
under the FDCPA, within five days after publishing notice, the debt
collector must send the debtor a letter containing information regarding
the debt, the creditor, and the debtor’s rights. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)
(2018). Among these rights are the rights to dispute the debt and to require
the debt collector to provide verification of the debt. Id. If a debtor
disputes the debt, “the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt . . . until
the debt collector obtains verification of the debt. . . .” Id. § 1692(g)(b)
(emphasis added).
The Sixth Circuit initially addressed whether the auction and
newspaper’s advertisement and postings constituted violations under the
FDCPA. The court first noted that these activities constituted debt
Debtor also averred the district court’s grant of summary judgment was improper
because the court had not yet adjudicated several of Debtor’s discovery motions.
However, the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court did not err by granting summary
judgment because Debtor produced his discovery motions only after the discovery period
concluded. Further, the Sixth Circuit noted Debtor did not allege sufficient facts to avoid
summary judgment.
1
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collection activities because their purpose was to procure payment for the
debt. However, Debt Collector argued it did not personally violate the
FDCPA because it was not the entity taking such actions; rather, it only
directed third parties to take the actions.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found that Debt Collector’s argument
frustrated the FDCPA’s intent. More specifically, while Debt Collector did
not itself take the actions, it still personally initiated the actions in order to
satisfy Michigan’s requirements for foreclosure by advertisement. Thus,
the court refused to find that Debt Collector “ceased” debt collection
activities merely because third parties (rather than Debt Collector)
performed the foreclosing functions.
Accordingly, the court held the FDCPA includes an affirmative duty
on debt collectors to stop all activities regarding debt collection, even
activities of third parties. More specifically, the court stated that “[t]he debt
collector cannot allow the essential statutory elements of a Michigan
foreclosure to proceed after receiving” a debtor’s timely challenge of the
debt. 2
Consequently, the court concluded Debt Collector violated the
FDCPA because Debt Collector did not cancel the auction or newspaper
advertisements or postings. Rather, Debt Collector allowed the newspaper
to publish three consecutive advertisements and post a foreclosure notice
at Debtor’s home, even after it received Debtor’s dispute letter.
On the other hand, though, the court held that Debt Collector’s other
actions did not violate the FDCPA. More specifically, Debt Collector’s
failure to communicate with Debtor did not violate the statute because it
is common practice for debt collectors to avoid communicating with
debtors. Moreover, the FDCPA dissuades and even disallows such
communications. See id. § 1692(c). Likewise, Debt Collector’s response to
Debtor’s complaint did not violate the statute because it constituted Debt
Collector’s attorneys’ “zealous advocacy” rather than Debt Collectors own
individual debt collection activity. However, because Debt Collector’s
other actions constituted violations of the FDCPA, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Scott has several important ramifications for legal practitioners in the
Sixth Circuit. Most importantly, attorneys should advise debt collectors to
adopt one of the following alternatives to avoid violating the FDCPA.
First, practitioners may recommend that their debt collector clients
The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that this duty survives only until the debt collector
procures and provides debt verification to the debtor in accordance with the statute.
2
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proactively maintain an ledger listing the debt collector’s actions in
furtherance of collecting the debt. 3 Accordingly, if a debtor challenges a
debt’s validity, the debt collector could use this ledger to ensure it cancels
all actions effectuated to collect the debt.
Alternatively, debt collectors may simply refrain from engaging in debt
collection activity until the dispute period elapses. However, this approach
suffers an efficiency shortcoming in that it imposes unnecessary costs
upon debt collectors. Particularly, if debt collectors delay initiating
foreclosure proceedings until the dispute period expires, they will
necessarily delay foreclosure by several weeks. Such a delay will inevitably
cause debt collectors to incur lost interest and opportunity costs associated
with not collecting the debt earlier. That said, these costs may be lesser
than those costs that the debt collector would incur by violating the
FDCPA.
In any event, Scott clarifies that a debt collector must cease its own
foreclosure practices as in addition to those practices implemented by
third parties after a debtor disputes a debt. Thus, it is imperative that
attorneys who represent debt collectors take some action to ensure their
clients remain on the pleasant side of the FDCPA.

See Katie Grzechnik Neill, Sixth Circuit: “Cease” Requirement Include Third Party
Activities Put into Action by Debt Collector, INSIDEARM (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00044637-sixth-circuit-cease-includes-activities-p/
(“[W]hile this decision focuses on foreclosures, it may have broader impacts on debt
collection as a whole.”). Of course, the ledger must also include those debt collection
activities of third parties that the debt collector put into motion.
3
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R E A L P RO P E RT Y
T E NA N C Y L AW
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that: (1) a cotenant who
excludes their cotenants from jointly owned real property is required
to pay rent to their cotenants; and (2) the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding the ousting cotenant compensation for
improvements or repairs made on the joint property from the
remaining cotenants. McCants v. McGavock, No. E2017-01712-COA-R3CV, 2019 WL 1934868; 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. May
1, 2019).

Autumn Bowling
The pertinent facts are as follows. Four siblings were devised their
family home (“the Property”) through their father’s will upon the passing
of their parents in 2013. Based on the language of the will, it was intended
that the four siblings be co-owners and cotenants of the Property. As
executrix of her father’s estate, Janella McCants (“Appellant”) executed a
deed to the Property that included all four siblings’ names. Before their
father’s death, Appellant lived at the Property to care for both her father
and the Property. In late 2013, Appellant emailed her three siblings
(collectively “Appellees”) an outlined agreement stipulating that Appellant
would continue to live at the Property and would renovate and maintain it
for the purpose of being a rental property. All parties agreed to this
arrangement.
Indisputably, through their email communications, Appellees agreed
to financially contribute to the necessary upkeep and repairs of the
Property. Accordingly, Appellant emailed a $48,000 estimate of repairs to
the Property to Appellees. On April 5, 2014, Appellant began renovations
to the Property despite lack of assent from Appellees for the
aforementioned quote.
Appellant’s pursuit of the repairs without agreement between all
cotenants caused tension and hostility amongst the siblings. In the midst
of this tension, Appellant moved the personal effects of Appellees left at
the Property to a locked portion of the basement in order to make the
necessary renovations. However, Appellant demanded Appellees retrieve
their belongings by specific deadlines and even threatened disposal of the
belongings, which was contrary to the Agreement that removal of
personal effects was not necessary until a renter was found.
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Five days after starting renovations, Appellant emailed Appellees with
the following ultimatum: “1) Sign the house over to me voluntarily or 2) I
will take the house involuntarily through partition sale after the deed is
recorded and the estate is closed. . . . Give me your decision by tomorrow
morning.” From this point forward, Appellant did not communicate with
Appellees until July 6, 2014, when one sibling requested to retrieve her
items from the Property, to which Appellant agreed. But when the sibling
arrived earlier than agreed, Appellant refused to allow the sibling to enter.
Ultimately, the police intervened, and the sibling was allowed to enter.
After this event, Appellees began to express their concern of being
excluded from the Property.
Appellant filed a complaint alleging breach of contract pertaining to
the agreement between the siblings about repairing and maintaining the
Property. In response, Appellees filed a counterclaim to partition the
Property. The trial court determined Appellant did not meet her burden
of proof for the contract claim and agreed with Appellees that they had
met their burden for partition. Subsequently, the trial court determined
that Appellant had excluded her cotenants and ordered Appellant to pay
rent to Appellees in the amount of $27,000, partitioned the Property, and
awarded Appellant $60,000 for the cost of the property renovations. Both
parties appealed, each appealing their requirement to pay the other.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed whether Appellant’s
actions constituted exclusion—and if that exclusion required paying rent
to Appellees. The court began its discussion by assessing whether
ownership of the Property was held in a joint tenancy or a tenancy in
common, the pertinent issue being whether the four unities—interest,
time, title, and possession—existed when the Property was conveyed. At
common law, the result of this difference was impactful. Specifically, a
common-law joint tenancy, where all four unities were present, included a
right to survivorship, while a tenancy in common, where all four unities
were not present, did not have that inherent right.
In deciding the first issue, the court cited Bryant v. Bryant, where the
Tennessee Supreme Court clarified that because joint tenancies no longer
have an inherent right to survivorship, a joint tenancy and tenancy in
common have essentially the same rights today—thus implying that there
is no longer a distinction between the two. See 522 S.W.3d 392, 399-401
(Tenn. 2017). Therefore, the characterization of joint tenancy versus
tenancy in common was irrelevant to Appellant’s case. Consequently, the
court characterized the Property as jointly held.
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After determining the characterization of the Property, the Court used
its right to “adjust the equities and settle all claims between or among the
parties.” See Yates v. Yates, 571 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1978). In exercising
this inherent right, the court cited five principles from Parker v. Lambert
that a court should apply when determining the equitable distribution of
partition sale proceeds:
(1) that courts will compensate a cotenant’s renovations if those
renovations actually improved the property’s value; (2) that it is
necessary that cotenants contribute equally to satisfy
encumbrances on the property; (3) that it is necessary that
cotenants contribute equally to necessary repairs of the
property except those that are for payment of personal services
for maintenance and caretaking, unless there is a contract to
stipulate such payment; (4) that a cotenant with sole possession
is of the property is liable to other cotenants for any profits
received in excess of his or her pro rate share; and (5) that rent
must be paid for use and occupation of a property by a cotenant
who is in sole possession and has excluded her cotenants or
denied cotenants their title of any part of the property.

206 S.W.3d 1, 5 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotes and alterations
omitted).
Because cotenants enjoy an equal right to possession, the McGavock
court quoted Parker, noting that “a cotenant must equally share both the
burdens of land ownership . . . as well as the benefits of the lands
ownership. If one cotenant bears a disproportionate share of the burden,
the other cotenants must provide compensation.” The court, further
relying on Parker, explained that exclusion does not bar the excluder from
bringing a contribution claim. Additionally, citing Brewer v. Brewer, the court
emphasized that “a tenant who pays more than his or her share for the
property may seek contribution to compensate him or her.” 2011 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 63, No. M2010-00768-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 532267, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb 14, 2011). Therefore, the court concluded that the
partition of the Property and an equal split of the sale proceeds between
all cotenants from the partition was not improper.
The court then applied the fifth Parker principle to Appellant’s case.
The court determined that the language of Parker did not require
aggressive “ouster” to be established and affirmed the trial court’s finding
that ouster had been shown. Specifically, the court stated that “[a]n ouster,
in the law of tenancy in common, is the wrongful dispossession or
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exclusion by one tenant in common of his cotenant or cotenants from the
common property of which they are entitled to possession.”
Finding that ouster had been established, and thus, affirming the trial
court’s previous ruling, the court denied Appellant’s argument that
Appellees were free to come and go as they pleased from the Property. As
Appellees contended, Appellant not only refused Appellees access to the
Property unless it was on her terms, but she also demanded that Appellees
remove their personal belongings from the Property. Accordingly, because
Appellant’s actions were considered exclusionary, the award of rent to
Appellees was in harmony with the fifth Parker principle.
The court then turned to the second issue, which was whether the
award of compensation to Appellant for the renovations to the Property
was an abuse of discretion. For this issue, the Court applied principles one,
two, and three from Parker.
Previously, the trial court held that Appellant had unclean hands
because, in addition to the $19,000 of renovations she had completed
prior to filing her complaint, she completed another $41,000 of
renovations after filing. However, the trial court opted not to apply that
doctrine when considering its award to Appellant and granted her the sum
of those two figures, $60,000. Because the applicability of the doctrine is
generally incredibly fact-specific and most properly suited for the trial
court’s determination, the court in this case affirmed that the nonapplication of the doctrine as within the discretion of the trial court.
Appellees also argued that the Court should remand the case to decide
if the renovations were improvements that actually enhanced the
Property’s value as required by Parker principle 1. But the Court found the
award to be within the trial court’s equitable discretion because Appellees
conceded to paying their share of taxes. The earlier agreement was for
Appellant to renovate and maintain the Property while living there for the
purpose of renting, and the Appellees had not objected to contributing.
Instead, they had objected to the cost of contributing.
This case is important to Tennessee practitioners because, despite the
court’s attempt to clarify its earlier ruling in Bryant, the court failed to
provide explicit guidance. The Court instead appears to teeter on
characterizing joint tenancies and tenancies in common as identical joint
ownerships, consolidating them into a “concurrent tenancy” while also
avoiding classifying an ouster as an adverse possession. The court’s
tiptoeing around these issues—and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
subsequent denial of certiorari—leaves room to wonder if the same
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outcome and award would have occurred had the parties not been siblings;
perhaps the Court was playing “Mom and Dad” to ensure each kid got his
or her fair share of the family property. Regardless of the court’s motives,
Tennessee practitioners should be aware of the court’s new “concurrent
tenancy” classification, as this opinion could affect many of their client’s
properties in this state.

C O N T R A C T L AW
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
The Tennessee Supreme Court utilized a contract dispute between
defendant, an insurer, and plaintiff, a company selling the
defendant’s insurance plans, to clarify Tennessee’s use of extrinsic
evidence in constructing integrated agreements. The Court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded holding that
defendant could retroactively adjust commission rates; defendant
could pay subagents directly; the agreement did not allow for
attorney fees for intraparty disputes; and the statute of limitations
would not be tolled given defendant’s underpayments were
undiscoverable. Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross BlueShield of
Tennessee, 566 S.W.3d 671 (Tenn. 2019).

Gary Brackett
From 1999 to 2012, in exchange for commission payments, Individual
Healthcare Specialists, Inc. (“Plaintiff ”) sold BlueCross BlueShield of
Tennessee, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) insurance policies. 1 The commissions for
these sales were governed by schedules which were updated sporadically
and appended to the General Agency Agreement (the “Agreement”),
which structured the pair’s overall relationship. These insurance policies
merited two types of commissions: first year commissions that were paid
the year the policy was enacted, and renewal commissions that were paid
if the policies were renewed annually. 2 However, on May 1, 2011,
Defendant’s updated commission schedule removed the language

1 The Agreement at issue here also provided Plaintiff would manage the
administrative rules of the subagents who sold the policies.
2 Each commission schedule surrendered controlling authority to the Agreement in
the event of conflict and allowed renewal commission rates to be set at the rate in place
at the time of sale, subject to change at Defendant’s discretion.
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preserving renewal rates at time of sale and lowered the commission rates
on renewals.
Subsequently, Plaintiff discovered Defendant had likely been
underpaying commissions owed to it since the parties formed their
relationship, prompting Plaintiff to file an action against Defendant for
underpayments totaling $15 million. 3 Plaintiff claimed Defendant
“wrongfully concealed” these underpayments, thus tolling the six-year
statute of limitations. 4 Finally, Plaintiff claimed Defendant breached the
Agreement by unilaterally and retroactively reducing commissions on
policy renewals.
After the action was filed, Defendant terminated the Agreement
“without cause” and began paying Plaintiff ’s subagents directly. This
action prompted Plaintiff to amend its complaint, claiming Defendant
breached the Agreement by paying subagents directly rather than Plaintiff.
Later, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgement 5 which the
trial court denied. 6 Following the denial of Plaintiff ’s motion, Defendant
also filed a motion for partial summary judgement, claiming it was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on the issues of attorney fees and statute
of limitations. 7 In response, Plaintiff submitted extrinsic evidence
involving testimony of employees involved in negotiating the contract,
which stated their understanding that the Agreement prevented
Defendant from enacting retroactive modifications and, further, that the
Agreement’s indemnification clause covered attorney fees for inter-party
disputes. The trial court relied on this evidence to deny the motion, stating
it created ambiguities within the instrument.

Around this time, Plaintiff and Defendant began negotiations for Defendant to
purchase Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff began analyzing and forecasting their revenue,
leading them to the discovery that Defendant had likely been underpaying commissions
owed to Plaintiff.
4 Plaintiff also alternatively claimed unjust enrichment and conversion if the court
opted not to toll the statute of limitations.
5 The motion stated Defendant breached the agreement by: (1) retroactively reducing
rates on renewal commissions; (2) paying Plaintiff subagents directly; and (3) claiming
Plaintiff was entitled to judgement as a matter of law for attorney fees from the action.
6 The trial court’s order stated the claims were “a matter of contract construction”
of an agreement where no “ambiguities” were present. From this, the court stated the
Agreement allowed Defendant to modify rates and pay subagents, but did not provide
attorney fees for Plaintiff.
7 Defendant claimed the statute of limitations prevented consideration of: (1)
underpayments more than six years before the action was filed; and (2) unjust enrichment
claims five years before the action was filed.
3
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At trial, the Plaintiff ’s extrinsic evidence relied on in Defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment was admitted. 8 At the conclusion
of the trial, the court held Defendant breached the Agreement by (1)
adjusting renewal commission rates on existing policies; (2) paying
commissions directly to subagents; and (3) underpaying Plaintiff its due
commissions. Additionally, the court tolled the statute of limitations,
stating Defendant’s underpayments were “inherently undiscoverable.” 9 In
response to the court’s ruling, both parties filed motions to alter or amend
the court’s judgment. 10 On appeal, the court upheld the trial court’s rulings
but reversed its award to Plaintiff for attorney fees. 11
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Defendant claimed the
trial court erred by considering Plaintiff ’s extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties’ intentions for the Agreement. Specifically, they contended it was
error for the trial court to hold the Agreement: (1) prevented Defendant
from modifying commission rates on existing policies; (2) prevented
Defendant from paying subagents directly; and (3) allowed for attorney
fees for inter-party disputes. Defendant also claimed the discovery rule
applied to breach of contract actions and arguendo the underpayments were
not inherently undiscoverable by Plaintiff. 12 Of course, on the other hand,
Plaintiff ’s appeal countered Defendant’s positions and additionally argued
the appellate court erred by reversing its award of attorney fees.
In the end, the Tennessee Supreme Court held the following: (1)
Defendant did not breach the Agreement by modifying renewal
commission rates for existing policies; (2) Defendant did breach the
Agreement by paying subagents directly in lieu of Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff
was not entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement’s indemnity clause;
and (4) the statute of limitations would not be tolled as Defendant’s
8 Initially, Defendant objected to Plaintiff ’s attempts to introduce extrinsic evidence
of the parties’ intention regarding the Agreement as inadmissible by virtue of the
Agreement’s integration. The court overruled these objections, relying on contextual
principles espoused in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
9 The court award Plaintiff $2.1 million, excluding attorney fees.
10 The court relied on Plaintiff ’s extrinsic evidence that the parties intended the
indemnity clause to include inter-party disputes.
11 The appellate court held that the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence
on the issue of attorney fees.
12Conversely, Plaintiff ’s appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court claimed the trial
court did not err in holding that Defendant breached the Agreement by: (1) modifying
commission rates on existing renewals, and (2) paying subagents directly; or (3) applying
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations.
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underpayments were not inherently discoverable. Specifically, the issue
before the Tennessee Supreme Court involved the lower court’s use of
Plaintiff ’s extrinsic evidence in construction of the Agreement. First, the
inclusion of the extrinsic evidence affected whether Defendant breached
the agreement by either retroactively adjusting the commission rate or
paying subagents directly. Additionally, the trial court’s use of the extrinsic
evidence also impacted whether Plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
under the Agreement’s indemnity provision.
The central aim throughout Tennessee’s evolution on contract
construction has always been to uphold the parties’ intent. 13 However,
intent has been understood in different ways throughout Tennessee’s
history, leading some to classify the state’s jurisprudence as “deep[ly]
conflict[ed].” 14 Initially, Tennessee employed a more contextual approach,
with emphasis on “ascertaining the intention” of the parties. 15 Later courts
would come to reject this holistic approach and apply a more plain
meaning or textual consideration of the instrument’s written terms. 16
Specifically, contextualism seeks to interpret the contract by considering
the full picture of the agreement, including the surrounding
circumstances. 17 Recalling Tennessee’s focus on the parties’ intent, this
approach equips courts to consider the “strongest evidence of intent[:]”
the parties “course of conduct.” 18
Early courts recognized the overall goal of inferring the intention of
the parties and allowed consideration of their “situation[,] . . . motive[,] . . .

Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 899 (Tenn. 2016); see also
McNairy v. Thompson, 33. Tenn. 141, 149 (1853) (The goal of constructing contracts is
to “do justice between the parties by enforcing a performance of their agreement
according to the sense in which they mutually understood it at the time.”).
14 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, 21 TENNESSEE PRACTICE: CONTRACT LAW & PRACTICE §
8:12 at 982 (2016).
15 Nunnelly v. Warner Iron Co., 29 S.W. 124 (Tenn. 1895). This wholistic contextual
approach was accomplished by consideration of the situation and motives of the parties
which induced the agreement and the purpose designed to be affected by it. See Nashville
& N. W. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 42 Tenn. 574, 583 (1865).
16 Intent was gleaned from the “usual, natural and ordinary meaning the contractual
language . . . without recourse to matters extraneous to the text of the agreement.” Planters
Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) (emphasis
added).
17 Staub v. Hampton, 101 S.W. 776 (Tenn. 1906).
18 Pinson & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Kreal, 800 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1990). Contextualism considers the agreement itself only a “memorial” of the agreement,
while intent is garnered from evidence outside of the instrument.
13
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and design . . . .” 19 However, at times, this holistic approach was
conditioned on the presence of ambiguities within the instrument. 20
Accordingly, whether the contract was ambiguous began to serve as the
threshold question of whether extrinsic evidence was needed to interpret
the contract. 21 This consideration served as a rebuke of extreme
contextual applications as embodied in Pacific Gas. 22 However, the
Tennessee Supreme Court still allowed consideration of outside evidence
in situations where no ambiguities were apparent if outside evidence
revealed ambiguities. 23
The threshold question explained above prompted courts to first
consider whether the instrument at issue possessed ambiguities warranting
consideration of outside evidence. This approach focused court’s
attention on the terms within the document’s four corners and “exalt[ed]”
the written instrument over external evidence. 24 Accordingly, this theory
of contract construction requires the court to adhere to the plain meaning
of the agreement’s terms even if unjust outcomes result. Unfortunately,
focusing strictly on the “four corners” of the written agreement may result
in harsh outcomes not reflective of the true intention of the parties.
Accordingly, to avoid the pitfalls of strict textualism while still prioritizing
the written text, Tennessee courts opt for a middle ground by preserving
the contract’s plain language but also considering its surrounding
circumstances. 25 This approach results in Tennessee courts both
19 Nunnelly v. Warner Iron Co., 29 S.W. 124, 127 (Tenn. 1895); see also Barnes v. Black
Diamond Coal Co., 47 S.W. 498, 499 (Tenn. 1898) (seeking to avoid “technical rules”
obstructing “common sense” in interpreting contracts).
20 See Perkins Oil Co. v. Eberhart, 64 S.W. 760, 762 (Tenn. 1901). Tennessee courts
recognized that not all agreements required consideration of extraneous evidence if the
contract’s writing and meaning were “plain and ambiguous” allowing the court to
“interpret [it] as a matter of law.” Id.
21 Ascertaining parties’ “inten[t] is a question of law . . . when the language is plain,
simple, and unambiguous.” Petty v. Sloan, 277 S.W.2d 355, 361 (Tenn. 1955).
22 See 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (allowing consideration of circumstances “even if the
contract language initially appears unambiguous”).
23 Staub v. Hampton, 101 S.W. 776 (Tenn. 1907). These “latent ambiguities required
consideration of outside evidence “to plac[e] the court in the same situation . . . [as] the
actors themselves.” Id. at 785.
24 This approach also presumes the parties have “spoken for themselves” and that
their words should be given the highest priority, particularly when ambiguities are absent.
Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins., 71 S.W.2d 1059, 1063 (Tenn. 1934).
25 See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Chem. Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tenn. 1975) (“A
contract cannot be varied” by oral evidence, but it “aids in determining the meaning of
the contract” and is “proper to be looked to by the court in arriving at the intention of
the parties.”); see also Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. v. Huddleston, 795 S.W.2d 669, 671
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prioritizing the text of the agreement and considering contextual evidence
to discern the parties’ intent.. Typically, parties illustrate their intention to
bar extrinsic evidence by including an integration clause, or merger clause,
within the agreement. Specifically, there are two types of integrations:
partially integrated, which allows extrinsic evidence to supplement terms, 26
and completely integrated, which bars any outside evidence. Parties elect
between partially and fully integrated agreements by the language of the
instrument or the completeness of the document. 27
The first issue the Court addressed was the Defendant’s contention
that the lower courts erred in concluding it breached the Agreement by
unilaterally reducing renewal commission rates on existing policies.
Ultimately, the Court agreed with Defendant’s assertion that this evidence
invoked the parol evidence rule and used this opportunity to clarify how
this type of evidence is affected by the parol evidence rule. Importantly,
the Court classified the schedule at issue within the Agreement as
unambiguous and fully integrated. Thus, the Agreement’s integrated status
barred the use of pre-contract negotiations that would in any way vary the
terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court’s
finding that the Agreement’s terms did not allow Defendant to unilaterally
modify commissions, thus barring consideration of Plaintiff ’s extrinsic
evidence.
The second issue the Court addressed was whether the lower courts
erred in holding Defendant breached the Agreement by refusing to pay
post-termination commissions to Plaintiff and instead payed those
commissions directly to the subagents associated with the policies.
Defendant contended that pursuant to the language of the Agreement,
Plaintiff was no longer entitled to receive the commission payments, and
thus was not in breach of the Agreement. Further, the Defendant again
asserted that the trial court’s reliance on Plaintiff ’s extrinsic evidence was
(Tenn. 1990) (Tennessee courts have shown that within its rules of contract construction
the intention of the parties is also determined by its “subject matter . . . circumstances .
. . and the construction . . . placed on the agreement by the parties carrying out its
terms.”).
26 A partially integrated agreement may not be contradicted by parol evidence, but
may be supplemented by consistent, additional terms. See Hines v. Wilcox, 33 S.W. 914,
915 (Tenn. 1896); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209–210 (1981).
27 If the agreement “appears to be a complete agreement on its face, it is presumed
to be a final, complete agreement.” Schaeffer v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 976 F.Supp. 736,
741 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). Alternatively, the less formal the instrument, and the more terms
the agreement leaves out that reasonable parties under the circumstances would
otherwise include the more likely the agreement is not “final.” Id.
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in error.. In determining this issue, the Court identified two relevant
provisions that governed Defendant’s payments to Plaintiff: (1) the
“Compensation Provision”; and (2) the “Termination Provision.”
Together, these provisions established that Plaintiff was “solely
responsible” for payments to subagents as long as they are “able, entitled,
or available.” Additionally, under the language of the Termination
Provision, if the Agreement was terminated, Defendant remained
obligated to pay Plaintiff commissions. Given this plain language, the
Court upheld the lower court’s ruling and supported its use of extrinsic
evidence.
Next, the Court considered the lower court’s use of extrinsic evidence
involving testimony that the parties intended their fee-shifting provision
to cover attorney fees for inter-party disputes. Specifically, Plaintiff argued
that inter-party disputes are covered by that provision, and the extrinsic
evidence further showed the parties’ mutual intent to this effect. 28 As such,
Plaintiff argued that they were not varying the terms of the agreement but
rather using contextual evidence to illustrate the intent of the parties to
give effect to the plain terms of the agreement. In its analysis of the
indemnity provision, the Court raised Tennessee’s adherence to the
“American rule” for attorney fees, which requires the contract to explicitly
state that attorney fees are provided. 29 Accordingly, the Court found the
language of the Agreement’s indemnity provision insufficient to explicitly
allow for attorney fees. Further, the Court supported its holding with cases
that showed that even if boilerplate language within the fee-shifting
provision qualified under the American rule, it did not extended to interparty litigation. 30 Notably, the Court affirmed that in Tennessee, parties
must specifically describe their indemnity provisions and outside evidence
will not compensate for inadequate drafting. 31
This case ultimately clarified Tennessee’s text-centered-but-contextfriendly approach to discern the intent behind a contract. The Court
explained that the parol evidence rule allows consideration of extrinsic
28 When the parties formed their agreement, they were “fierce competitors” giving
rise to the probability of litigation arising between them. This concern prompted the
parties to intend their indemnity clause to cover litigation amongst themselves.
29 If the contract does not specifically state that attorney fees are recoverable in the
event of litigation, they are excluded. See, e.g., Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v.
Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Tenn. 2009).
30See, e.g., Holcomb v. Cagle, 277 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
31The court was not swayed by Plaintiff ’s argument that other jurisdictions allow
boiler plate indemnity clauses to include inter-party disputes.
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evidence as long as it does not contradict the agreement’s text. In the event
of ambiguous text, extrinsic evidence can be considered to aid in
interpretation. Furthermore, extrinsic evidence will not compensate for
imprecise fee-shifting arrangements in indemnity provisions. Additionally,
the Court emphasized that post-contract conduct is not necessarily
indicative of pre-contract intent and should not trump an agreement’s
writing. Finally, the Court declined to consider whether the discovery rule
should apply to breach of contract cases. This case informs contract
drafters to ensure the text reflects the parties’ intentions, though outside
evidence may be considered depending on its effect, and courts are not
shelters against an agreement’s harsh outcomes.

A S S E T V A L UA T I O N
WITNESS CREDIBILITY
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
classification of the appreciated value in shares of stock as marital
property under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i).
Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, No. W2017-01864-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 325493;
2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Morgan Kain
In Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial
court (1) properly designated an asset as marital property; (2) correctly
determined the value of several marital assets when granting a divorce;
and (3) appropriately granted the correct amount of in solido alimony to
the wife, as well as the award of attorney’s fees incurred during the appeal.
This case first entered the court system because the wife filed for divorce
in the Circuit Court of Shelby County on November 7, 2013, claiming
“inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences.”
Throughout the nine day trial, various witnesses, called by both parties,
introduced testimonial evidence to assist with the trial court’s ruling.
Ultimately, the trial court found that the husband’s witnesses—as well as
the husband himself—lacked credibility and granted the divorce, citing
inappropriate marriage conduct as the reasoning. Additionally, evidence
and testimony showed that the wife originally worked as a teacher until the
couple had their only child; she later began working intermittently as a
part-time realtor earning a maximum of $20,000 per year. The husband
worked at his family-owned business, Delta Wholesale Liquors (“Delta”),
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during the marriage as well as pursued a career as a venture capitalist. The
trial court considered the parties’ employment when making its asset
distributions and determining alimony. In the trial court’s order, the court
distributed the marital assets between the parties, as well as allocated
$200,000 in solido alimony to the wife and $200,000 for her attorney’s fees.
However, the trial court later amended its order specifying that the “[w]ife
shall only be awarded the total sum of $200,000 as alimony in solido, rather
than a total of $400,000.”
Following the trial court’s decision, both parties appealed. In pertinent
part, the husband raised several issues on appeal surrounding the
classification and valuation of specific marital assets, including the
appreciation value of his shares of stock in Delta. On the other hand, the
wife’s appeal focused on the amount of alimony awarded to her as well as
her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.
First, the court examined the trial court’s determination of the
appreciation value of the husband’s shares of Delta stock as marital
property. Both parties agreed that when the two were married, the
“[h]usband owned 103.25 shares of Delta” which the “court valued . . . at
$75,000 [originally].” Throughout the marriage, the husband was involved
with and worked at Delta until he sold his interest for $3,699,983. During
the trial, the husband confirmed and stipulated that due to the “[w]ife’s
role as a homemaker[, she] significantly contributed to the appreciation in
value of the shares of Delta.” Therefore, the court ultimately found the
appreciation of said stock to be marital property in light of both parties’
contribution to its appreciation. The husband challenged this finding and
argued that the increase in value of the stock was not due to any
contributions on his part.
In determining whether the appreciation in stock should be marital
property, the Court looked to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4121(b)(1)(B)(i), which states that marital property “include[s] income from
and appreciation on separate property that accrues during the marriage where
each party substantially contributed to [the separate property’s] preservation
and appreciation.” (emphasis added). Further expanding on what is
considered “substantially contributed to,” the Court quoted Yates v. Yates,
which held that “a spouse’s contributions must be real and significant[;
t]hey need not, however, be monetarily commensurate to the appreciation in
the separate property’s value, nor must they relate directly to the separate
property at issue.” No. 02A01-9706-CH-00122, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS
849; 1997 WL 746377 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1997) (emphasis added).
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Regarding both parties’ substantial contributions, the Court
highlighted the trial court’s seven page discussion on its determination that
both parties “substantially contributed to the preservation and
appreciation of [the husband’s] stock in the [Delta].” Primarily, the lower
court relied on the stipulation made by the husband indicating the wife’s
contribution to the appreciation in the stock and his steady involvement
in Delta throughout the marriage. Accordingly, the Court upheld the lower
court’s ruling and found no error, emphasizing that the evidence
demonstrated that the husband’s involvement with Delta did, in fact, show
substantial contribution to the appreciation in the stock.
Next, the Court inspected the trial court’s valuation of marital assets,
carefully considering various properties, including CGN Energy (a
business), “Investec 1407 Union Partnership” (a real estate investment),
ownership interest in LGR Beverage Group, an account with a credit
union, and a security interest in a patent. In reviewing the trial court’s
valuation, the Court clarified the standard by which it examined the
determinations, stating that “the trial court’s decisions with regard to the
valuation and distribution of marital property will be presumed to be
correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.”
Although both the husband and wife introduced expert testimony that
established values for each marital asset, the trial court ultimately took the
determination of the wife’s expert under advisement. The wife’s expert
relied upon Shelby County and Cheatham tax assessments and appraisals
from 2015 in making his assessment. The husband argued against this
expert, claiming that the expert was not qualified to give such
determinations. The Court noted that “‘[g]enerally, questions pertaining to
the qualifications, admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert
testimony are matters left to the trial court’s discretion.’” (quoting City of
Pulaski v. Morris, No. M2010-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS
591; 2010 WL 3732161 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010)).
Upon reviewing the trial court’s conclusion on such assets, the Court
affirmed all findings of value except for one. When considering the trial
court’s determinations, the Court indicated that tax assessments and
appraisals are an acceptable measurement to determine value of such
assets, and the husband never once objected to the tax appraisals’
introduction into evidence. Additionally, the Court expressed that each
determination made by the trial court regarding the value of the various
marital assets was supported by said appraisals as well as testimonial
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evidence from the expert witness. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
trial court did not err in its findings for the majority of the marital assets.
However, the Court did vacate and remand for further classification
the trial court’s valuation of one property owned by Atled Investments,
LLC. Atled Investments, LLC—a company owned by the husband along
with his two brothers—purportedly owned two condos, but the wife
alleged the existence of a third condominium—the “unnamed
condominium.” The Court noted the trial court’s contradictions when the
trial court asserted that the unnamed condo was sold and no longer in the
possession of the husband, yet also stated that the husband did not
produce evidence of said sale and categorized the condo as marital
property. Because of this apparent contradiction, the Court vacated and
remanded the determination of the unnamed condo to the trial court for
further clarification.
Finally, the Court addressed the wife’s arguments concerning alimony
and attorney’s fees on appeal. First, the Court considered the amount of
alimony allocated to the wife. The Court looked to “‘determine whether
the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reach[ed] a decision
that is not clearly unreasonable.’” (quoting Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211
S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006)). The lower court granted $200,000 of in
solido alimony. The wife contended, however, that her attorney’s fees
equaled $272,000—forcing her to utilize her determined amount of
marital assets to cover the remaining fees. Accordingly, the Court modified
the award to allocate a total of $300,000 in solido alimony to the wife.
Furthermore, the Court inquired into whether long-term alimony—
also known as rehabilitative or transitional alimony—should additionally
be awarded to the wife based on the wife’s previous employment as a
special education teacher and part-time work as a realtor when the couple’s
child was born. Because the trial court “did not consider whether an award
of short-term alimony would be appropriate” or if long-term alimony
would be applicable due to the wife’s circumstances, the Court remanded
the issue for further consideration. Lastly, the wife asserted a claim for her
attorney’s fees on appeal. The court has the discretion to determine the
allocation of such fees if applicable. See Seaton v. Seaton, 516 S.W.2d 91,
93–94 (Tenn. 1974); Davis v. Davis, 138 S.W.3d 886, 890 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003). Ultimately, the court concluded that because of the “disposition of
the appeal and [the w]ife’s need and [the h]usband’s ability to pay,” the wife
should be granted her attorney’s fees.
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In light of the court’s rulings, attorneys should be aware of the experts
they bring forth to determine the valuation of various marital assets. The
wife’s expert in this case likely valued the properties higher than the
husband’s expert, which ultimately impacted the final amount of assets
split between the two parties simply because the trial court found the wife’s
expert to be a more creditable source for determination.
Additionally, when looking to categorize appreciation as either
separate or marital, attorneys should focus significantly on how much the
parties “substantially contributed” to the appreciation of the asset. Here,
the husband and his attorney stipulated to the wife’s contribution to the
appreciation of Delta’s stock. Therefore, the wife did not have to put on
any proof that she did, in fact, contribute to said stock. If not for the
stipulation, the wife would have had the burden to introduce evidence
demonstrating that she also substantially contributed to the appreciation in the
husband’s separate property stock.
Lastly, this case is a good reminder to practicing attorneys that the
image and impression that their client(s) exude matters within the court
room. Here, the trial court had a negative view of the husband, ultimately
finding him lacking in credibility because of his evasiveness, demeanor,
actions and reactions in the court, lack of truthfulness, failure to provide
specific documents, and the continual admonishment by both the court
and the husband’s own attorney. Because of these instances, the trial
court’s view of the husband and the statements made by him and those
involved in his argument were negatively impacted. Therefore, etiquette
and demeanor are important factors to keep in mind not only during the
trial itself, but also through various interactions and the processes leading
up to the trial.

